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SESSION 1: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
MODERATOR: Meredith Brown*
MR. BROWN: Michael, one thing that occurred to me as I
listened to your remarks is the problem of the many different
countries that are host countries. The world is interconnected.
This also relates to something that Mr. Gyohten said, which is an
effort to develop within a region regulation and some sharing of
information. But if the world is truly global, you need the shar-
ing of information notjust within East Asia but on a global basis.
The question is whether national borders protect you against an
international banking crisis anymore than the steel bulkheads of
the TITANIC protected that ship from the danger that occurred
in one compartment and spread quickly to the rest of the ship.
You suggest one answer, which I think is very interesting,
which is not a supranational banking regulation. God knows,
we'll never get the political organization to do that. If Europe
can't quite get to a single currency without severe heartache,
how is the world going to get to a supranational banking organi-
zation? As you suggest, maybe the best approach is to have the
Group of Thirty, or the group of whatever number you like, de-
veloping its own standards. What's the best way to solve the dan-
ger of an international banking crisis? Michael, do you want to
try that first, and then Mr. Gyohten?
MR. PATTERSON: Let me react to some of what you said. I
think that more cooperation and information sharing among
regulators while not a panacea, is certainly a very good first step.
That can start on a regional basis for banks that are primarily
active in that region, as Toyoo said, and then evolve globally.
I like the idea of self-regulatory initiatives, like the Group of
Thirty, because, as you say, it's very difficult to imagine that all
the regulators of the world would get together. But in the end, I
think, it is the responsibility of regulators to do what they can,
and they have to be satisfied that the prescriptions developed by
the self-regulatory body are ones that they are happy with.
So it's a good effort, but in the end the world's regulators
are going to have to cooperate to solve this problem - and
when I say "solve this problem," I don't mean that there's any
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way that they can prevent financial debacles within individual in-
stitutions, and we should never assume that they can. But if they
are working closely together, know each other, have information
about institutions that do business in their countries, they can
react more quickly and effectively to mitigate any crisis that does
occur.
MR. GYOHTEN: If you look at the experiences of Mexico
or more recently Thailand, we have to conclude that the initial,
and probably the most important, cause of those crises came
from their own economy. You can detect rather lax elementary
fiscal policies and lack of effective supervision, which of course is
shared by many of the countries. But I think the idea to put
your own house in order must come first.
But in the real world you really cannot expect that every-
body will behave as a very good boy, so you need a certain mul-
titerritorial arrangement to force them to follow those good
principles. In that respect I certainly support the idea of setting
up some kind of multiterritorial supervisory standard and func-
tions.
Probably the biggest obstacle in meeting that goal is that
each national authority still tries to maintain its own authority
and they don't want to see their authority be diluted by this su-
pranational function. So to convince them of the need to con-
cede and compromise on their sovereignty in that respect I think
a variety of private initiatives would be very useful. I think, in
that sense, the Group of Thirty's work, and also some work being
carried out by the Institute for International Planners in Wash-
ington and BIS, will be very important.
Inevitably this ought to be a time-consuming, step-by-step
approach.
MR. BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Gyohten.
MR. VOLCKER: Let me just make a couple of comments,
Meredith. In the interest of full disclosure, I'm the Chairman of
the Group of Thirty, and I don't think we're going to end up
running the world.
But this is a very interesting question. It's certainly right,
we're not going to prevent any possibility of a financial crisis.
What can we do to minimize it? Let me suggest a few, maybe
rather arbitrary-sounding rules, but I think you've got to be arbi-
trary in some of these areas.
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You can get some basic protection, I think, by assuring that
no institution or set of institutions is overly large compared to
the whole. I don't think we're in any immediate danger of that,
and as the world gets more homogenized and institutions are
acting all over, of course you have more competition and you
don't have to worry so much about local, or even national, con-
centration. But I think ultimately you want a lot of players so
you're not too dependent upon any one player. That is an arbi-
trary restriction, I suppose, at some point. Nonetheless, I think
you get into those kinds of arbitrary restrictions.
One that we have, which goes up and down in popularity in
the way it's applied, is capital requirements. It is a striking initia-
tive that has been made in commercial banking only for a rela-
tively uniform approach toward capital requirements right
around the world for major banks. Any bank can say, "In my
particular situation it's arbitrary and unreasonable because I'm
different, I'm not like everybody else, and I've got better man-
agement or I've got safer assets."
But if you're going to have an effective supervisory regula-
tory mechanism around the world, given the pressures that have
been described here, I think some uniformity in this area at the
expense of arbitrariness is probably essential.
Of course, the problem now is you have that to a considera-
ble degree in the banking world. You don't have it with all these
other institutions that compete directly with banks, particularly
investment banks that may be doing the same kind of business
very largely, and that is one of the challenges for the future.
I can't refrain from announcing my own hobby horse in this
area, one of the few things that gets me down to Washington to
testify, and it refers partly to the matter of size. But I think we
really ought to stop, at least for the indefinite future, financial
conglomerations. The argument for that is very powerful, as
Michael has described. The argument for going beyond that
and linking up financial institutions with commercial establish-
ments and industrial firms strikes me as extremely weak, and
there is nothing to be gained and a whole lot to be lost in terms
of the possibility of financial crisis, among other things.
MR. BROWN: Do you do that by regulation or do you do
that by sort of the common sense that they don't fit together very
SESSION 1: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
well and eventually they get divorced - Xerox and its insurance
operations, as an example?
MR. VOLCKER: I would do it by appropriate legislation,
but I also think that it runs with the grain of the market for the
reason that you suggest. But there are active experimenters in
the other direction, which I would just as soon not - the prob-
lem is, if you let some do it, then the pressures become "why
don't we weaken the law and let everybody do it?" and we'll get
in trouble. I don't know whether I want to carry on that debate.
Just let me make one final point, which I think has already
been raised. I do think it's important that central banks have a
strong role in this, for the reasons that have already been sug-
gested. They are the ones that have the most interest - they're
the ones that are going to be blamed, for one reason, which
gives them an active interest - but they're also the ones that
have the resources, the prestige by and large, the knowledge, the
continuity, and I think it is a mistake to remove them from the
regulatory process because they're the ones that have to pick up
the pieces when it inevitably happens.
I think a lot of changes made in. the U.K., in terms of a
central bank and some other changes, are desirable. This one I
think they made a mistake on.
MR. PATTERSON: Can I make one comment, Paul? You
mentioned capital requirements, and I think that is a fairly im-
portant topic. I think that you have made the point that defec-
tive capital requirements are better than none at all, but they
certainly are a problem, aside from the fact that they are not
uniformly required for all financial players, as you pointed out.
Just to give you one example, we have to hold eight percent
capital against a one-year commitment for AAA Exxon and none
at all on a thirty-year obligation for the United States to Mexico.
Something is wrong there and needs to be fixed.
That example highlights one of the factors that is driving
the development of the secondary market for loans that I re-
ferred to earlier. Banks can no longer afford to hold many of
them on their balance sheets because the capital requirements
are completely uneconomical.
MR. VOLCKER: That is one of the arbitrary elements, there
is no doubt about it. You see strange results. How you deal with
it in the political world is a question.
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MR. BROWN: We have a comment from Mr. Gyohten, if we
may.
MR. GYOHTEN: May I comment on that issue of financial
conglomeration? I certainly agree with what Paul said because I
believe the financial services industry is certainly different from
other types of industries, in the sense that they deal with credit.
As I mentioned in my presentation, in Japan we are now
contemplating the establishment of a holding company system,
which was not allowed so far. In that exercise, I think we should
be careful not to mix the financial services industry with other
commercial-type industry too easily. So even if we are going to
allow setting up of the holding company structure,. I personally
believe we should confine it to a financial holding company. In
other words, in this group of holding company structure, only
the financial service industry will be included, because if you mix
ordinary industries with the credit-providing institutions, I think
you cannot avoid the risk of those credit-providing institutions
being influenced by different interests. So I think on this partic-
ular point we need to move cautiously.
MR. VOLCKER: If I may just make one other point, I think
what lies behind a lot of this - and which was alluded to earlier
one way or another earlier, but let me just make it more explicit
- is this tension that exists between a perceived need of a gov-
ernment or a central bank to protect the stability of a system and
the undue conflict that may give to participants in the system
toward risk-taking, the so-called "moral hazard" - that the more
assurance you give that there will be no crisis or you'll be pro-
tected from a crisis if it happens, encourages activity that will
give rise to the crisis. We spend endless amounts of time worry-
ing about that, and there is no good resolution that I know of.
But I take in this area a very old-fashioned view - maybe it's
inadequate - that I hate to expand the presumption of protec-
tion beyond something called a commercial bank. I would say
"something called a commercial bank" because the boundaries
of commercial banking get a little fuzzy. But I would just as soon
avoid any presumption, if I can, of government support for peo-
ple that participate in certain defined activities. Operation of a
payment system, providers of liquidity, creators of money are all
fuzzy concepts, but nonetheless I think somewhat definable.
Simply to try to minimize the so-called moral hazard - and it is
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one element in this extension of financial institutions that in-
clude banks beyond finance, because then it implies - and
Michael made a very eloquent statement about how a bank or
any organization wants to operate its organization as a compre-
hensive whole, without all these intrusive, so-called "firewalls"
and restrictions, and have one capital pool that can be allocated.
If that's all true, and it's true if you run a commercial opera-
tion too, you are extending the so-called federal safety net, if you
have it, beyond the bank, beyond the financial world, into the
commercial world. That implies a degree of regulation. I don't
think we want capital requirements on General Motors.
MR. BROWN: And when does a bank end and GE begin,
for example?
MR. VOLCKER: That is correct. You've got to make a dis-
tinction.
MR. BROWN: I think we have raised a large number of
questions. There is one sort of helpful benediction that I can
give you from the Managing Director of the IMF, who said, I
don't know where we'll have or when we'll have the next interna-
tional economic crisis, but I suspect it will begin with a banking
crisis.
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